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FREEDOM UNBOUNDED
For want of a nail the shoe was lost; for want of
a shoe the horse was lost; and, for want of "reason-
able" arrest laws a case was lost. This happens
every day, not in a single case but in many cases,
in which serious violations of criminal laws are
involved. They stand as mute witnesses to the
fact that many vicious criminals are turned loose
on technicalities to continue on the morrow with
their depredations against society.
A decision handed down by the New York Court
of Appeals in People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y. 2d 162,
182 N.E. 2d 103, decided April 5, 1962, is note-
worthy in this respect. The defendant was arrested
for robbery. Immediately after his arrest he was
taken before a magistrate. The magistrate in-
formed the accused of all of his rights, including
his right to counsel. The accused, at this time,
requested none. He was thereafter taken down-
town by a detective. While on the way, he said
to the detective, not in response to any question:
"Assuming I am the fellow: what do you think I
could get if I did admit it? Can you work out some
sort of a deal?" This took place only minutes after
he had been fully advised of his rights, before he
was indicted, and his statement was unsolicited
and voluntarily made. Nevertheless, the Court of
Appeals held that such statement was inadmissible.
Many conscientious persons who are concerned
directly in the administration of criminal justice
pause to ask: "What is the rationale of such a
decision?" Similarly, many decisions that result
in the release of known criminals due to unrealistic
interpretations of arrest laws, especially as to
what constitutes reasonable cause to arrest, evoke
a like query.'
' For example see Rios v. United States, 364 U.S.
253, 80 S.Ct. 1431 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361
U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168 (1959); and, Miller v. United
States, 357 U.S. 301, 78 S.Ct. 1190 (1958).
It is archaic arrest laws, however, that must
share much of the burden for the imbalance that
exists today that gives to criminals more protec-
tion than is provided law-abiding citizens. Bas-
ically, the same arrest laws, spawned around the
middle of the twelfth century in the setting of a
simple agrarian society when the mace and cross-
bow were in style, define today the authority of
peace officers and private persons to arrest. Modern
law enforcement, therefore, is handicapped in its
attempt to discharge effectively its twin mission-
to prevent crime and protect society-when it
stands armed with arrest laws that have changed
hardly at all since their gestation. This is the great
dilemma that faces not only law enforcement but,
in the final analysis, society as well if it is to endure.
DISRESPECT FOp LAW Am AUTiORITY
History tells us, concludes Oxford Historian,
Charles Reith, in his study, TaE BLND EYE or
HiSTORY, that every nation that has failed to en-
force its rules has perished.2 Consequently, the law
enforcement services in this country and the laws
under which they must discharge their tasks, should
be of great concern to all Americans.
The evidence indicates, however, that far too
often, their concern is apathetic at best and, in
general, non-existent. It is not uncommon to read
news stories of acts of "moBocRAAc"; that is, in-
cidents of people virtually waging open warfare
against police officers lawfully engaged in carrying
out their sworn duties. The Honorable Gerald S.
Levin, Presiding Judge of the Criminal Division of
the Superior Court in San Francisco, at a meeting
of the Criminal Law Section of the American Bar
Association in San Francisco, August 6, 1962, said:
Recently I sat through the trial of a case
where an individual was arrested for the offense
2 London, England: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1952.
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of burglary. The testimony indicated that the
defendant seized the gun of the policeman and
pointed it at him. He was disarmed by another
policeman at the scene. During this altercation a
gathering crowd booed the police and applauded
the individual, although they had no knowledge
of the reason for the arrest.
The same thing has occurred at athletic con-
tests. Frequently policemen who are endeavoring
to perform their duties are ridiculed and as-
saulted by members of the public. This attitude
of the public was referred to recently by J.
Edgar Hoover writing about two officers who,
when making an arrest, were mobbed and beaten
by bystanders: "While the officers were being
beaten, not one citizen could or would muster
the courage to assist them or even to call for ad-
ditional help so the men could be properly de-
fended."
Illustrative are the headlines which appeared
in the San Francisco newspapers on June 25 and
June 26, 1962, which read "Young Toughs At-
tack Cops" and "Defiant Jeers and Violence
Greet the Law Today". The editorial in the last-
mentioned paper said, ".... courts must be stem
as well as understanding".
Numerous incidents of disrespect for law and au-
thority, marked by acts of violence against peace
officers while engaged in carrying out their sworn
duties in a lawful manner, are documented in the
Uniform Crime Reports of the F.B.I. and in many
of the annual reports of police departments.
Greater respect for law and authority can be
promoted by giving law enforcers the authority
they need to enforce the criminal laws. To withhold
it can lead only, in certain situations, to the con-
tinuance of questionable practices on the part of
some peace officers. They feel that the community
also has rights. They see a need for more of a bal-
ance between the rights of the individual on one
side and the right of the community to be secure
against fear of injury to person or property on the
other. They contend that modernizing current ar-
rest laws can help to achieve that. People, in gen-
eral, will have greater respect for law and au-
thority when laws help law enforcers to discharge
their duties according to law.
ATTI TUDES or LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFIcERs
Generally speaking, professional-minded peace
officers are mindful of the fact that they face a
compelling obligation to know and follow the law.
They recognize, moreover, their duty to obey the
law when enforcing the law, and they are anxious
to do so. Many obstacles confront them, however.
Many roadblocks, in their eyes, are essential safe-
guards to a free society. With them they have no
quarrel. For officers, by large, are staunch be-
lievers in, and defenders of, their federal and state
constitutions. The very nature of their day-to-day
work tends to promote that outlook. They learn
at first-hand, on the public streets and in dark
alleys, how people feel when they are deprived of
their liberty.
An assumption can be made, furthermore, that
most peace officers feel strongly about the need to
maintain a strong and independent judiciary. An
independent judiciary, to them, is one of the major
differences that distinguishes a free society from
the slave state. That does not preclude the right to
disagree, however, with some of the decisions
reached by appellate courts.
They take exception, as do many judges (evi-
denced by many decisions that swing on the phi-
losophyof asingle judge) to some of the highly tech-
nical interpretations that are made, for example, in
the very troublesome area of arrest, search, and
seizure. In the past 23 years the Supreme Court of
the United States has handed down 21 opinions in
which arrest, search, and seizure have been the
main issues. In only 1 case did the court agree
unanimously. The case, Thompsot v. City of
Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 624 (1960),
logically could be excluded as it involved a petty
arrest for loitering and disorderly conduct. (The
21 cases are collected as part of Appendix A.)
Undoubtedly, some officers, either willfully or
through lack of knowledge, abuse their authority
at times. Self-respecting peace officers believe that
excessive abuse of authority on the part of their
fellow officers, generally, cannot be condoned.
Nevertheless, at the same time, they do ask for
sufficient authority, consistent with promoting the
general aims of a free society, to make their com-
munities safer places for all people. They recognize
the truth of what Dr. Samuel Johnson said some
200 years ago: "The danger of unbounded liberty
and the danger of bounding it have produced a
problem in the science of government which human
understanding seems hitherto unable to solve."
This has even more meaning today as totalitarian-
ism stalks the face of the earth. The pendulum
swings dangerously in the direction of unbounded
liberty which is as bad as tyranny and is often the
forerunner to the mailed fist.
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EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AN:ENDm:ENT
One writer who has given much thought to the
problem said:
(I)n applying the Fourth Amendment the
Court has unintentionally created a situation in
which concern with protecting the rights of those
charged with crime has resulted in extending
greater protection to property interests than to
personal liberty. Current interpretations of the
amendment, in fact, appear to weaken the pro-
tection of the personal liberty of the average
law-abiding citizen-even to accord his interest
in privacy and property markedly less protection
than is accorded to similar interests of persons
suspected of crime.3
In this explosive age, if a peace officer is to carry
out his duties even fairly effectively, a realistic
balance must be established between the security
of the individual and the security of society. In an
article in 1961 in the NEW YoRx LAW JOURNAL,
Cornelius W. Wickersham, Jr., United States At-
torney for the Eastern District of New York, de-
clared: "The law-abiding citizen and the public
are entitled to deeper sympathy on the part of our
judges." And, he might have added, on the part of
many of our legislators. For it is their task to shape
the criminal law to fulfill its basic purpose of pro-
tecting society.
Both law makers and judges, in general, tradi-
tionally, tended to follow that philosophy for many
years before and after this country was founded.
When the Bill of Rights was added to the Consti-
tution of the United States in 1791, the Fourth
Amendement was viewed by its framers and the
people of their time as a limitation that would
achieve a reasonable balance in safeguarding per-
sonal liberties on the one hand and protecting
society on the other. Professor Barrett makes the
point and makes it well:
When Pitt denounced the cider tax and James
Otis spoke out against writs of assistance and
Patrick Henry opposed adoption of the Consti-
tution without a Bill of Rights, they were pri-
marily interested in protecting the homes of or-
dinary persons against indiscriminate and un-
reasonable governmental invasions .... 4
Between 1607 and 1914, for 307 years, American
courts construed the Amendment in that context.
In all judicial proceedings real evidence was ad-
3EDwARD L. BARRETT, JR., "Personal Rights,
Property Rights and the Fourth Amendment," THE
SuPzREmE CounT REvIEw (Chicago: Copyright 1960
by The University of Chicago Press), p. 49.
4 Ibid., p. 7 1.
missible that was trustworthy and relevant. The
courts were concerned with the innocence or the
guilt of a person accused of a crime and in their
search for truth accepted such evidence and refused
to halt a proceeding to inquire into the methods
that were used to secure it. That is the rule, sub-
stantially, in all the English-speaking countries of
the British Commonwealth. That is the rule in
most, perhaps, all, other nations of the world.
Yet developments in the United States, espe-
cially within the past two decades, ".. . suggest
that under the modem Fourth Amendment there
has been a startling reversal of position. Those
types of governmental invasions of privacy most
likely to involve the law-abiding person are sub-
jected to the least restraint, those directed against
persons suspected of crime, to the greatest." 5
In 1914 in the Weeks case, however, (Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341) the logic
underlying the "trustworthy-relevant" rule was
brushed aside. The Supreme Court of the United
States crystallized a state court decision as the
federal exclusionary rule of evidence. Thereafter in
federal courts, regardless of the trustworthiness
and relevancy of real evidence, timely motion be-
ing made, it was rejected if the evidence had been
obtained by means of an "unreasonable" search
and seizure. It is noteworthy, indeed a paradox,
that the rule to this day is inapplicable to civil ac-
tions wherein, at times, the stakes are quite high.
Various states subsequently embraced the rule,
in whole or in part, either by statute or judicial
decree, with the result that when Elkins (Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S.Ct. 1437) was de-
cided June 27, 1960, some twenty-odd states were
numbered as followers of the exclusionary doctrine
of the Weeks case. The trend reached its zenith,
quite unexpectedly, when on June 19, 1961, the
Supreme Court of the United States, in Dollree
Mapp v. State of Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1648,
in a 6-3 opinion to reverse Mapp's conviction but
5-4 on the following point, held that though the
exclusionary rule is "judicially implied," it is
nevertheless a "Constitutionally required" safe-
guard and applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendemnt. Thus, by a majority of
one vote the authority of the legislatures of 50
states, according to the views of many people, has
been diluted in regard to the administration of
state criminal laws. (A Petitition for Rehearing in
Mapp v. Ohio was denied by the Supreme Court of
the United States on October 9, 1961. The Petition
Ibid., p. 71-2.
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gives the views of the prosecutor, who was caught
in the middle, as well as some illuminating historical
background of the "exclusionary rule." The edi-
tors of TnE JOURNAL OF C =miL LAw, Cuar-
NOLOGY AND POLICE SCIENCE published the Peti-
tion in its entirety in the November-December 1961
issue, pp. 439-444.)
Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissent in Mapp said:
"In overruling the Wolf case (Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 1949) the court in my opin-
ion has forgotten the sense of judicial restraint
which, with due regard to stare decisis, is one ele-
ment that should enter into deciding whether a
past decision of the court should be overruled.
Apart from that, I also believe that the Wolf rule
represents sounder constitutional doctrine than
the new rule which now replaces it."
Mr. Justice Clark, in speaking for the majority
in Mapp, summed up another view in asserting
that "There are those who say, as did Justice (then
Judge) Cardozo, that under our constitutional ex-
clusionary doctrine 'the criminal is to go free be-
cause the constable has blundered.'. . . In some
cases this will undoubtedly be the result. But, as
was said in Elkins, 'there is another consideration
-the imperative of judicial integrity.'. . . The
criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that
sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government
more quickly than its failure to observe its own
law, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own
existence... Our decision, founded on reason and
truth, gives to the individual no more than that
which the Constitution guarantees him, to the
police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the court, that
judicial integrity so necessary in the true adminis-
tration of justice."
ENFORCEmENT AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Law enforcement officers, for the most part, re-
alize that decisions of the Court, based upon cur-
rent interpretations of the Constitution, are the
law of the land and that the mandates should be
obeyed scrupulously. Compliance, at times, as in
the Mapp case, poses difficult problems for police
administrators. Many of them like Los Angeles
Chief of Police William H. Parker, an attorney, and
for more than 35 years a police officer, consistently
point out how crime control is affected when the
scales of justice become weighted too heavily in
favor of the small segment of society that persists
in living beyond the law.
"There are two distinct fallacies," he declares
"in the present judicial emphasis upon court super-
vision of police. The freeing of an obviously guilty
criminal in those cases where the ex post facto de-
termination of the court brands the evidence prof-
fered by the prosecution as the fruits of an unrea-
sonable search is predicated on the theory that the
police must not be allowed to profit by reason of an
improper act. This attitude exemplifies the 'cops
and robbers' contest to which law enforcement has
been relegated. It is the guilty criminal who profits
when he is given his freedom on a technicality, and
it is the innocent victims of his future crimes who
lose. The criminal prosecution pits the people of the
state, and not the police, in opposition to the crim-
inal. I fail to see how the guilty criminal freed con-
stitutes a personal loss to the police officer who has
merely attempted to bring a criminal to justice.
The other inconsistency is the failure of the courts
to apply the exclusionary rule in civil cases. If the
constitutional guarantees are in balance, the
litigant in a civil case should be entitled to the same
protection from the court on constitutional mat-
ters that are afforded the defendant in a criminal
action. Yet the defendant in a petty gambling case
is entitled to oppose the introduction of the evi-
dence against him on the grounds of unreasonable
search or illegal seizure while the defendant in a
civil action, who may be a wife and mother fighting
for her marriage and custody of her children, has no
right to the exclusion of illegally seized evidence.
This double standard is difficult for me to upder-
stand... It appears that society is guilty of a
fraud upon itself."6
Federal and state judicial decisions of the past
23 years, wherein arrest, search and seizure have
been in issue in criminal proceedings, bring out
sharply the narrow construction that many courts
tend to apply as to facts that constitute reasonable
grounds. The meaning of the term has changed like
a cancerous growth which, today, penetrates deeply
into the sinews of law enforcement. The courts
refuse, quite understandably, to define the term in
a definitive fashion.
In most cases decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States in that period when the legality
of an arrest or the reasonableness of a search and
seizure were before the Court, the issue has been
resolved by a divided Court. "Probable cause" or
"reasonable grounds to believe" stands, then, in
the vanguard as a perennial problem to effective
law enforcement. Many arrests and searches and
seizures that have been declared illegal, with that
6 W. H. PAR1Mc, "Discipline v. Destruction," in an




mystical term as the yardstick of measurement,
have provoked many questions and much argument
inside and outside the ranks of law enforcement.
What is far too often overlooked, or forgotten com-
pletely, is the fact that it is one thing to arrest on
reasonable grounds and quite another to prove a
charge in court-beyond a reasonable doubt. This, too,
is a paradox that deserves a great deal more thought
than it receives.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REHABILITATED
Peace officers would like to see a more "hard-
nosed" interpretation given to facts that are suffi-
cient to constitute reasonable grounds to make an
arrest and to search and seize physical objects.
They do not stand alone as many members of the
legal profession are of like mind. Many law-abiding
citizens feel the same way. What might have been
reasonable, they say, to constitute "reasonable
grounds to believe" in a simple agrarian society, is
very unreasonable now. They ask that the courts
look at the facts that lead to an arrest, or a search
and seizure, at the time, the place, and under the
circumstances, as seen by an arresting officer in
the light of his specialized training and experience.
Now is the time to reappraise, not only that
enigma, but various other problems that confront a
modern law-enforcement agency in enforcing
criminal laws. "Law must be stable, and yet cannot
stand still," Mr. Justice Cardozo reminds us. "In
order to know what.., law is, we must," said Mr.
Justice Holmes, "know what it has been, and what
it tends to become. We must alternately consult
history and existing theories of legislation. But the
most difficult labor will be to understand the com-
bination of the two into new products at every
stage."
With those views as a framework of reference it
appears that: (1) people, in general, forget that
law enforcement is fundamentally their responsi-
bility; (2) people, in general, are apathetic to the
needs of law enforcement; (3) judges, too often,
fail to take into consideration the total atmosphere
that makes up an arrest or a search and seizure;
and, (4) legislators, too often, forget that obsolete
criminal laws fail to keep pace with the needs of a
changing society.
Such omissions should be matters of great con-
cern to all persons who are concerned seriously with
the future of a free society. Of infinitely great im-
portance to any government are the means that it
uses to secure observance of its laws. If laws are
not observed, the most perfect laws that the wit of
man can devise are useless and government is im-
potent. Its powers are always proportionate to the
degree of success or failure of its means of securing
law-observance.
It is essential, therefore, to see clearly that some-
thing must be done in this country to secure better
law-observance. There must be laws and the laws
must be enforced. If American-law enforcement
fails in the contest to secure better law-observance
and pressure results in the adoption of a highly
centralized police system, (at either the federal or
state level) the people will lose not only their police
but their democracy and their liberty. If law en-
forcement survives as the people's protector all else
that people cherish will be saved. (This does not
mean, however, that liaison and staff relationships
should be discontinued.)
Different measures could be initiated or extended
that would tend to promote better law-observance.
However, for the purpose of this article, only very
broad strokes will be used to fill in a rather large
picture. Of immediate concern, it can be suggested,
to maintain law enforcement as a strong protective
service in a free society, are four major goals:
1. COMMUNITY EDUCATION. This is a
program long overdue that merits high pri-
ority. People must be aroused to their re-
sponsibilities to keep their communities good
places in which to live. Organizations like the
American Civil Liberties Union, National
Council of Christians and Jews, and the Na-
tional Lawyers Guild (to name a few) whose
objectives embrace community education,
should spearhead educational programs at the
community level to enlighten people about
criminal laws and emphasize the citizens'
duty to actively support their law enforce-
ment agencies.
2. PUBLIC APATHY. This is an infection that
is a painful affliction to law enforcement. It is
a trait that often characterizes the attitudes
of public officials and educators toward the
selection and training of prospective and prac-
ticing law enforcement personnel and in the
quality of the leadership assigned to direct
law enforcement operations. They need to be-
come better informed about law enforcement
and accept the fact that law enforcement, in
one form or another, is an essential arm of
government and then insist that its personnel
measure up to the tasks to be performed.
3. ARREST LAWS. The archaic arrest laws of
a past century that now regulate the enforce-
[Vol. 54
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND A FREE SOCIETY
ment activities of federal, and most state law
enforcement officers, should be revised. Con-
temporary arrest laws are inadequate in an
age of moon shots, cobalt bombs, and tel-
stars, to deal effectively with the criminal who
utilizes the most recent advances of science
for his own nefarious purposes.
4. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE. This judi-
cially created rule of evidence now "constitu-
tionally required" represents a formidable
opponent, in its present form, to effective law
enforcement. The prime architects of the rule
could be persuaded, perhaps, to remove or to
temper its impact, if state governments would
take action to keep the threat of unreason-
able searches and seizures properly bounded.
Maybe this could be done by providing as a
safeguard a "new kind of civil action, or bet-
ter, a summary type of proceeding, for a sub-
stantial money judgment in favor of the
wronged individual, whether innocent or
guilty, and AGAINST T E OLITICAL SUB-
DIVISION whose enforcement officers violated
that person's rights." It is submitted that
such legislation would be a strong incentive
to move polictical subdivisions to provide
competent law enforcement services as well
as to take a greater interest in their activities.
CONCLUSION
In sum, then, all of us must be ever more mind-
ful that "To be free", in Lord Acton's words, "a
people must understand freedom is not the power
of doing what we like but the right of being able
to do what we ought."
It is a good bargain.
APPENDix A
Part I
The Supreme Court of the United States since the
October 1949 term to March 1, 1963, decided 21 cases
wherein an arrest or a search and seizure were directly
in issue. The opinions are listed hereunder, beginning
with the most recent case, going back to United States
v. Rabinowitz, decided February 20, 1950.
OPnIoN
1. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 5-4
83 S.Ct. 407 (1963).
2. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 82 S.Ct. 6-3
1218 (1962).
3. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684 6-3
(1961).
4. Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381, 81 S.Ct. 7-2
623 (1961).
5. Chapman v. Unitea States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 8-1
S.Ct. 776 (1961).
6. Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 80 5-4
S.Ct. 1431 (1960).
7. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 5-4
S.Ct. 1437 (1960).
8. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 8-1
S.Ct. 725 (1960).
9. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 80 S.Ct. 5-4
683 (1960).
10. Thompson v. City of Louisille, 362 U.S. 9-0
199, 80 S.Ct. 624 (1960).
11. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 7-2
S.Ct. 168 (1959).
12. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 79 S.Ct. 5-4
804 (1959).
13. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 7-1
S.Ct. 329 (1959).
14. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 78 7-2
S.Ct. 1253 (1958).
15. Giordendlo v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 6-3
78 S.Ct. 1245 (1958).
16. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 78 6-3
S.Ct. 1190 (1958).
17. Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346, 77 6-2
S.Ct. 828 (1957).
18. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 76 S.Ct. 5-4
292 (1956).
19. Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 74 7-1
S.Ct. 280 (1954).
20. United States v. feffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 6-2
S.Ct. 93 (1951).
21. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 6-2
70 S.Ct. 430 (1950).
Part II
In the same period, January 1, 1950 to March 1,
1963, the Court decided 15 cases that involved, only
incidentally, an arrest or a search and seizure. The
decisions involved one or the other of the topics in
relation to some issue like excessive bail; taking an
accused before a magistrate; equitable relief; wiretap-
ping (using the term broadly); and, self-incrimination.
OPINION
1. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 81 9-0
S.Ct. 365 (1960).
2. McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 81 5-4
S.Ct. 138 (1960).
3. Ohio ex. rd. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 80 4-4
SCt. 1463 (1960).
4. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 499, 77 9-0
S.Ct. 1356 (1957).
5. Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 448, 77 9-0
S.Ct. 1332 (1957).
6. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 77 6-1
S.Ct. 1173 (1957).
7. Steinberg v. United States, 76 S.Ct. 822 9-0
(1956).
8. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 74 S.Ct. 5-4
381 (1954).
9. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 73 S.Ct. 8-1
232 (1952).
10. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 72 S.Ct. 6-3
599 (1952).
11. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 72 S.Ct. 5-4
525 (1952).
12. Butterfield v. Zydok, 342 U.S. 524, 72 S.Ct. 5-4
525 (1952).
13. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 8-0
205 (1951).
14. Stefandli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 114, 72 S.Ct. 7-1
117 (1951).
15. Carignan v. United States, 342 U.S. 36, 72 8-0
S.Ct. 97 (1951).
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